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LIABILITY AND CONSENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO BE
SUED—TORTS IN GENERAL: THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT INTERPRETS THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIM
ACT’S LAW ENFORCEMENT PROVISO
Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441 (2013)
ABSTRACT
In Millbrook v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held
the law enforcement proviso—an exception to the Federal Tort Claim Act’s
(“FTCA”) preservation of sovereign immunity for intentional torts—
applied to torts committed by law enforcement officers regardless of
whether the officer was engaged in investigative or law enforcement
activity. The Court, granting certiorari to address a division among circuits
as to how the proviso should be interpreted, reasoned that a plain reading of
the statute’s text revealed congressional intent for immunity determinations
to depend on officers’ legal authority, not the specific activity they were
performing during the alleged tort. Thus, under the Court’s holding in
Millbrook, the question of whether the government has waived sovereign
immunity to intentional torts via the law enforcement proviso depends on
the powers invested in the officer, not whether the officer was conducting a
search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest. The Court’s holding in
Millbrook will increase the federal government’s liability in regard to torts
committed by law enforcement officers, and it leaves certain significant
questions unanswered.
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FACTS

On January 18, 2011, Kim Millbrook filed suit under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (“FTCA”) against the United States, asserting claims of
negligence, assault, and battery.1 Millbrook’s complaint alleged that on
March 5, 2010, while he was incarcerated in federal prison, he was placed
in a chokehold by one Federal Bureau of Prisons officer and forced to
perform oral sex on another.2 The district court dismissed Millbrook’s suit,
finding that under the FTCA, the government had only waived sovereign
immunity for intentional torts committed by law enforcement officers when
such torts occurred during a search, seizure of evidence, or arrest.3 In a per
curiam opinion, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district
court and summarily affirmed its decision.4

1. Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441, 1443-44 (2013).
2. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441 (2013) (No 1110362). The brief specifically alleged the following details:
Petitioner Kim Millbrook is a prisoner incarcerated in the Special Management Unit at
United States Penitentiary Lewisburg (USP Lewisburg). On March 5, 2010, shortly
after being transferred to USP Lewisburg, Millbrook was taken to a basement holding
cell by a prison officer. The officer who had transported Millbrook later returned with
two other officers. Millbrook was placed in restraints and removed from the cell. One
officer placed Millbrook in a choke hold and forced him to his knees. Millbrook was
then forced to perform oral sex on the second officer. Throughout the incident, the
third officer stood watch by the door. The officers warned Millbrook that if he told
anyone about the assault, they would kill him.
Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
3. Millbrook v. United States, No. 3:11-cv-131, 2012 WL 526000 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2012).
4. Millbrook v. United States, 477 Fed. Appx. 4, 6 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam). “Millbrook
did not allege that the alleged conduct occurred in the course of an arrest for a violation of federal
law, or during the course of a search . . . . As Millbrook’s appeal presents no substantial question,
we will summarily affirm the District Court judgment.” Id. at 5-7 (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
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Millbrook subsequently filed an in forma pauperis petition,5 and on
September 25, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States granted him a
writ of certiorari.6 The Court limited its review to the question of
“[w]hether 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2680(h) waive the sovereign
immunity of the United States for the intentional torts of prison guards
when they are acting within their scope of their employment but are not
exercising authority to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make
arrests for violation of Federal law.”7 Initially, the United States,
represented by the Department of Justice, intended to defend the Third
Circuit’s decision.8 However, it later announced it agreed with Millbrook
and that it would not defend the judgment below.9 Thereafter, the Court
appointed an amicus curiae to defend the Third Circuit’s ruling.10
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Because it has sovereign immunity, the government of the United
States cannot be sued in state or federal court.11 “If Congress so chooses,
however, it may waive the United States’ sovereign immunity and prescribe
the terms and conditions on which the United States consents to be sued and
the manner in which the suit shall be conducted.”12 A discussion of the
government’s waiver of immunity at the center of the dispute in
Millbrook—the Federal Tort Claims Act—follows below. But to provide
context for that discussion, an analysis of the history and development of
sovereign immunity is essential.

5. “In the manner of an indigent who is permitted to disregard filing fees and court costs.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 386 (4th pocket ed. 2011). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (West, Westlaw
through P.L. 113-31 approved 8-9-13); FED. R. APP. P. 24.
6. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. 98 (No. 11-10362).
7. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
8. Brief for the United States at 2, Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. 98 (2013) (No. 11-10362).
9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20-21, Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441 (2013)
(No. 11-10363) (Question from Justice Scalia: “[T]he United States didn’t take this position
below, right?” Government’s reply: “[W]e determined that the position [below] was . . . not
correct under the text.”). Id.
10. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae, Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. 98 (2013) (No. 1110362).
11. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999) (“It is unquestioned that the Federal
Government retains its own immunity from suit not only in state tribunals but also in its own
courts.”).
12. Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 797 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
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A. THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The United States inherited the doctrine of sovereign immunity from
England.13 “When the Constitution was ratified, it was well established in
English law that the crown could not be sued without consent in its own
courts.”14 As early as 1651, Thomas Hobbes attempted to explain the
rationale behind the rule: “The sovereign . . . is not subject to the civil laws.
For having power to make and repeal laws, he may, when he pleaseth, free
himself from that subjection by repealing those laws that trouble
him . . . .”15 The doctrine originated during feudal times.16 “[N]o lord
could be sued by a vassal in his own court, but each petty lord was subject
to suit in the courts of a higher lord. Since the King was at the apex of the
feudal pyramid, there was no higher court in which he could be sued.”17
Many have lamented that such a doctrine is antithetical to a democratic
system. Justice Miller, reflecting on the differences between the English
Monarchy and the United States, remarked:
Under our system the people, who are there called subjects, are the
sovereign . . . The citizen here knows no person . . . to whom he
must yield the rights which the law secures . . . there is no reason
why deference to any person, natural or artificial, not even the
United States, should prevent him from using the means which the
law gives him for the protection and enforcement of that right.18
Others have found legitimacy in the doctrine. Despite their professed
abhorrence to monarchial tyranny, prominent constitutional framers such as
“Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall, publicly
endorsed the concept of sovereign immunity during the ratification process
for the United States Constitution.”19 Madison declared: “[J]urisdiction in
controversies between a state and citizens . . . is much objected to . . . It is
not in the power of individuals to call any state into court.”20 Similarly,
Hamilton wrote: “It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
13. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882) (“[T]he doctrine is derived from the
laws and practices of our English ancestors . . . it is beyond question that from the time of Edward
the First until now the king of England was not suable in the courts of that country, except where
his consent had been given on petition of right . . . .”).
14. Alden, 527 U.S. at 715.
15. THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 190 (A.R. Waller ed., 1904) (1651).
16. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414-15 (1979) (“The doctrine, as it developed at
common law, had its origins in the feudal system.”).
17. Id.
18. Lee, 106 U.S. at 208-09 (emphasis in original).
19. Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L.
REV. 439, 443 (2005).
20. Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1208 (2001).
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amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent . . . . This is the
general sense, and the general practice of mankind . . . Unless, therefore,
there is a surrender of this immunity . . . it will remain with the states.”21
Remain with the states it has22—and also the federal government. The
Supreme Court, in a triad of landmark decisions, has defined the doctrine’s
applicability to the federal government.23 Initially, the doctrine was largely
discredited by a 5-4 majority vote in the historically captivating case of
United States v. Lee.24 In a country still reeling from a devastating civil
war, the Court was tasked with deciding the fate of present-day Arlington
National Cemetery.25 The descendent of John Park Curtis—the adopted son
of George Washington—Mary Anna Curtis inherited a tract of land and
mansion then called the Arlington Estate.26 In the main hall of the
Arlington Mansion, Curtis married a man who would later become the
commander of the Confederate Army—Robert E. Lee.27 After General Lee
accepted his commandership, the Lee family fled the Arlington Estate for
Confederate-held territory.28 For obvious reasons, Mary Anna could not
return to Union-held Alexandria, Virginia to pay taxes on the estate, so she
sent a relative to pay the taxes for her.29 Because an owner of the estate
was not tendering the money, the tax commissioner refused the proffered
payment.30 The United States subsequently purchased Arlington at a tax
sale; a Union general used it as his headquarters, and later it became the
final resting place for Union casualties.31
21. The Federalist No. 81 at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(1788).
22. “[T]he Constitution’s structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by [the
Supreme] Court make clear, the States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they
retain today . . . . Although the Constitution establishes a National Government with broad, often
plenary authority over matters within its recognized competence, the founding document
specifically recognizes the States as sovereign entities.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713
(1999) (internal quotation and citation omitted). See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919
(1997) (noting, as examples of Constitutional reservations of state immunity, “the prohibition on
any involuntary reduction or combination of a State’s territory, Art. IV, § 3; the Judicial Power
Clause, Art. III, § 2, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art. IV, § 2, which speak of the
“Citizens” of the States; the amendment provision, Article V, which requires the votes of threefourths of the States to amend the Constitution; and the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, § 4 . . . .”).
23. Sisk, supra note 19, at 466.
24. 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882).
25. Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1612, 1634 (1997).
26. Sisk, supra note 19, at 447.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Siegel, supra note 25, at 1634.
30. Id.
31. Sisk, supra note 19, at 447-48.
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In protest, Mary Anna’s son brought a suit in ejectment against military
officers occupying the property.32
Recognizing what the dissent
characterized as a clear end-around the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the
Court allowed the suit to go forward:
No man in this country is so high that he is above the law . . . All
officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are
creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it . . . Courts of justice
are established, not only to decide upon the rights of the citizens
against each other, but also upon rights in controversy between
them and the government.33
Accordingly, the Court allowed Lee to recover the Arlington property from
the United States because he was suing officers of the government, and not
the government itself.34 Justice Gray, in a dissenting opinion, objected to
the Court’s disregard for sovereign immunity:
To maintain an action for the recovery of possession of property
held by the sovereign through its agents . . . is to maintain an
action to recover possession of the property against the sovereign;
and to invade such possession of the agents . . . is to invade the
possession of the sovereign, and to violate the fundamental
maxim, that the sovereign cannot be sued.35
In Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation,36 the Court
looked more favorably on the doctrine. Larson was decided on the heels of
World War II; the plaintiff alleged the War Assets Administration had
breached a contract regarding a sale of coal.37 Again, rather than suing the
agency or government itself, the plaintiff sued the agency’s director.38 This
time, the Court, finding legitimacy in the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
framed the question narrowly:
The issue here is whether this particular suit is . . . in effect, a suit
against the sovereign . . . If it is, then the suit is barred . . . because
it is, in substance, a suit against the government over which the
court, in the absence of consent, has no jurisdiction . . . The district

32. Id. at 448.
33. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1982).
34. Id. at 221. Following the Supreme Court’s decision, Lee sold Arlington back to the
federal government for the sum of $150,000, and today it remains a national military cemetery.
Sisk, supra note 19, at 448.
35. Lee, 106 U.S. at 226.
36. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
37. Id. at 684.
38. Id.

2013]

CASE COMMENT

347

court held that this was relief against the sovereign and therefore
dismissed the suit. We agree.39
In Malone v. Bowdoin,40 the Court “reinforced and extended the Larson
rule and thus further solidified the doctrine of federal sovereign
immunity.”41 Justice Stewart admitted Lee had never been overturned, but
nonetheless found sovereign immunity barred yet another suit against a
federal officer:
[T]he Lee case has continuing validity only where there is a claim
that the holding constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property
without just compensation . . . No such claim has been advanced in
the present case . . . [I]t was rightly dismissed by the District Court
as an action which in substance and effect was one against the
United States without its consent.42
In sum, the Court has “reinvigorated the doctrine of federal sovereign
immunity, and today it is well-ensconced within the legal structure of
federal government civil liability.”43 Justice Holmes’s reflections on the
logical and practical underpinnings of the doctrine, made more than a
century ago, still find truth today:
Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a
sovereign from suit without its own permission, but the answer has been
public property since before the days of Hobbes. A sovereign is exempt
from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.44
B. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT
PROVISO
Yet, despite the entrenched doctrine of sovereign immunity, citizens
were sometimes able to acquire redress for tortious injury caused by the
federal government before passage of the FTCA in 1946.45 Rather than
suing the United States, citizens could petition Congress to enact special
legislation—called private bills—for the purpose of compensating them for

39. Id. at 688.
40. 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
41. Sisk, supra note 19, at 455.
42. Malone, 369 U.S. at 648.
43. Sisk, supra note 19, at 446.
44. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (internal citations omitted).
45. Paul F. Figley, Understanding the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Different Metaphor, 44
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1109, 1109 (2009).
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torts inflicted by the government and its agents.46 This system was
criticized “as being unduly burdensome to the Congress and as being unjust
to the claimants, in that it [did] not accord to injured parties a recovery as a
matter of right but [based] any award that may be made on considerations
of grace.”47
Many called for reform: “John Quincy Adams complained about the
inordinate time Congress spent on claims matters. Millard Fillmore urged
that a tribunal be established to handle private claims. Abraham Lincoln
called for . . . change in his first annual message to Congress.”48 Relief
finally came in 1946 as Congress attempted to cope with a government that
had dramatically increased in size due to the Great Depression, World War
II, and general Roosevelt Era Reforms.49 Part of the Legislative
Reorganizing Act of 1946, Congress passed the FTCA.50 The Act’s
objective was “to waive a part of the governmental immunity to suit in tort
and permit suits on tort claims to be brought against the United
States . . . .”51
Upon its passage, the Act made the United States liable for damages
caused by “any employee of the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment . . . if [under the same circumstances] a private
person would be liable . . . .”52 However, many legislators expressed
concern with such a “radical innovation,” and certain exceptions to the
Government’s general assumption of tort liability were made.53 One of
these various exceptions—the intentional tort exception—was at the center
of the dispute in Millbrook.54 Under the intentional tort exception,
Congress has maintained governmental immunity from most intentional
torts.55 Specifically, Congress has not waived governmental immunity from
“any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
46. David W. Fuller, Intentional Torts and other Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 375, 378 (2011).
47. H.R. DOC. NO. 1287, at 662 (1945).
48. Figley, supra note 45, at 1108.
49. Fuller, supra note 46, at 378.
50. Figley, supra note 45, at 1109.
51. H.R. DOC. NO. 1287, at 661 (1945).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-31).
53. Fuller, supra note 46, at 384. For example, the federal government still maintains
immunity against suits based on government action of a discretionary nature, lost letters by the
Postal Service, and claims arising in a foreign country. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (West, Westlaw through
P.L. 113-31).
54. Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441, 1444 (2013) (“We granted certiorari to
resolve a Circuit split concerning the circumstances under which intentionally tortious conduct by
law enforcement officers can give rise to an actionable claim under the FTCA.”) (internal citation
omitted).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-31).
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malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights.”56 In 1974, however, Congress
carved out an exception to this reservation of immunity “by adding a
proviso covering claims that arise out of the wrongful conduct of law
enforcement officers.”57 This exception-to-the-exception has been dubbed
the “law enforcement proviso.”58 It “extends the waiver of sovereign
immunity to claims for six intentional torts, including assault and battery,
that are based on the ‘acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement
officers.’”59 “As a result of the law enforcement proviso, the FTCA now
permits suits based on tortious conduct by federal law enforcement
officers . . . .”60
Congress decided to add this proviso, and waive immunity from torts
committed by law enforcement officers, “in response to a national outcry
over certain widely publicized law enforcement excesses in the early
1970’s.”61 Raids conducted by federal drug enforcement agents (“DEA”) in
Collinsville, Illinois were specifically mentioned in the statute’s legislative
history.62 In an account detailing the alleged raids, the New York Times
reported:
The long haired, unshaven, poorly dressed men who burst into the
[victims’] homes shouting obscenities were federal narcotics
agents hunting, with no known warrants, for something or
someone. They went, however, to the wrong houses. . . . [They
threw one victim] down on the bed, handcuffed his arms behind
his back and said: you move and your [sic] dead . . . . There were
crashes elsewhere. A television set among other things was thrown
across a room. An antique plaster dragon was shattered. Cameras
were smashed on the floor. Papers were strewn about.63
Against this background, in Millbrook v. United States, the Court was
tasked with determining how much of its sovereign immunity the federal
government had actually intended to forfeit.
56. Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. at 1443.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)).
60. Fuller, supra note 46, at 385.
61. Id.
62. Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d 868, 874 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Sen. Rep. 93-588,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2791). For an in-depth discussion of the
Collinsville raids and Congress’ response, see Nguyen v. U.S., 556 F.3d 1244, 1254-57 (11th Cir.
2009).
63. Andrew Malcom, Drug Raids Terrorize 2 Families—by Mistake, N.Y. TIMES, April 29,
1973, at 1-2 (internal quotations omitted).
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III. ANALYSIS
Justice Thomas delivered the Court’s unanimous opinion.64 It held the
FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity for intentional torts committed by
law enforcement officers applies to such torts “regardless of whether the
officers are engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity, or are
executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest” when the tort
was committed.65 First, the Court discussed its reason for granting
certiorari.66 Next, it explained the proviso should be interpreted using a
plain text approach.67 And last, the Court applied the interpretive canon of
in pari materia.68
A. THE COURT’S REASON FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI:
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Court granted certiorari “to resolve a Circuit split concerning the
circumstances under which intentionally tortious conduct by law
enforcement officers can give rise to an actionable claim under the
FTCA.”69 Specifically, the Court cited disagreement between the Third and
Ninth Circuits’ narrow interpretation of the proviso and the Fourth Circuit’s
broad interpretation.70
In Pooler v. United States,71 the Third Circuit found the plaintiffs’
complaint insufficient to state a cause of action under the FTCA.72 The
plaintiffs sued the Veteran’s Administration (“VA”) alleging a police
officer employed by the VA had unlawfully arrested them.73 The court
interpreted the proviso to waive immunity only for torts committed by law
enforcement officers during the specific law enforcement activities of
64. Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. at 1442.
65. Id. at 1446.
66. Id. at 1444 (“We granted certiorari . . . to resolve a Circuit split concerning the
circumstances under which intentionally tortious conduct by law enforcement officers can give
rise to an actionable claim under the FTCA.”) (internal citation omitted).
67. Id. at 1445 (“The plain language of the law enforcement proviso answers when a law
enforcement officer’s ‘acts or omissions’ may give rise to an actionable tort claim under the
FTCA.”).
68. Id. at 1446 (“Congress adopted similar limitations in neighboring provisions . . . but did
not do so here. We, therefore, decline to read such a limitation into unambiguous text.”).
69. Id. at 1444.
70. Id.
71. 787 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1986).
72. Id. at 873.
73. Pooler, 787 F.2d at 869 (“The arrests were made pursuant to warrants issued by a
Pennsylvania judicial officer on charges that Pooler and Bradley sold marijuana on the premises
of the VA hospital . . . . [W]ith respect to the investigation, they allege that [authorities], in
engaging the services of a VA employee . . . to serve as an informant, selected an unreliable
person with known past drug involvement, and of less than average mental capacity.”).
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preforming a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest.74 Because the
court found the plaintiffs’ complaint did not alleged a tort had occurred
during one of those specific law enforcement activities, it upheld the lower
court’s dismissal of the complaint.75 The court based its reasoning on the
fact that § 2680(h) defined law enforcement officers as individuals
“empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make
arrests for violations of Federal law.”76 Thus, under the holding in Pooler,
the government retained immunity for all torts committed by law
enforcement personnel—provided they were not committed during the three
specific law enforcement activities enumerated in 2680(h)’s definition of a
law enforcement officer.77
Although not as strictly as Pooler, the Ninth Circuit, in Orsay v. United
States Department of Justice,78 also defined the proviso narrowly.79 The
plaintiffs, Deputy United States Marshalls, sued the Department of Justice80
for an alleged assault by their supervisor.81 The complaint claimed that on
a number of occasions the supervisor pointed a loaded gun at them and
pretended to pull the trigger.82 Although not requiring the tort be
committed during specific types of law enforcement activity, the court held
the “waiver reaches only those claims asserting that the tort occurred in the
course of investigative or law enforcement activities.”83 The court reasoned
that the proviso’s legislative history, showing Congress was concerned with
remedying federal law enforcement abuses, “lends support to a statutory
construction that limits the government’s waiver of its immunity to
intentional torts committed in the course of investigative or law
enforcement activities.”84

74. See Pooler, 787 F.2d at 872 (“[T]he Pooler and Bradley complaints do not state claims
falling within the proviso to section 2680(h) because no federal officer is charged with a tort in the
course of a search, a seizure, or an arrest.”).
75. Id. (“No matter how generously we read them . . . the complaints do not charge that [the
officer] committed an intentional tort while executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an
arrest.”).
76. Id. (internal citations omitted).
77. Id.
78. 289 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2002).
79. Id. at 1127.
80. The United States Marshall Service is a subdivision of the United States Department of
Justice. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (The supervisor “allegedly pointed a loaded gun at Appellants on a number of
occasions, and said things like: ‘You’re dead,’ ‘You’re history,’ ‘Gotcha,’ and ‘You never had a
chance.’”).
83. Id. at 1136.
84. Id. at 1135. However, the court omitted any definition of “investigative or law
enforcement activities.”
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In Ignacio v. United States,85 the leading case on the other side of the
split, the plaintiff sued the United States for an assault he allegedly suffered
at the hands of a fellow employee while they were working as guards at a
security checkpoint outside the Pentagon.86 The lower court, following the
holding in Orsay, dismissed the complaint because the alleged tort did not
occur while the tortfeasor was “engaged in investigative or law enforcement
activities.”87 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals held the law enforcement proviso “waives United States’
sovereign immunity regardless of whether an officer is engaged in an
investigative or law enforcement activity when he commits an assault.”88
The court found the plain language of the proviso required such a holding,
and it opined the Pooler and Orsay Courts had erred in their interpretive
methods: “[W]e note [those] courts relented to secondary modes of
interpretation without first establishing the ambiguity of the statutory text.
Where, as here, the text of the statute is unambiguous, we should not
engage in an analysis of legislative history to find ambiguity.”89
B. THE COURT’S PLAIN TEXT INTERPRETATION
The Supreme Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s plain text
approach: “The plain text confirms that Congress intended immunity
determinations to depend on a federal officer’s legal authority, not on a
particular exercise of that authority.”90 It rejected the court-appointed
amicus curiae’s argument that immunity should only be waived for torts
arising out of searches, seizures of evidence, or arrest, noting “the FTCA’s
only reference to searches, seizures of evidence and arrests is found in the
statutory definition of investigative or law enforcement officer.”91 The
Court reasoned that while the statutory definition may focus on specific law
enforcement tasks, the law enforcement proviso itself “focuses on the status
of persons whose conduct may be actionable, not the types of activities that

85. 674 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2012).
86. See id. at 254 (“[W]hile stationed at a security checkpoint for Pentagon employees, Lane
and Ignacio had a disagreement over the caliber of an M-16 round. Initially, their disagreement
led only to a bet.
It escalated . . . when they were again stationed at a security
checkpoint . . . . Lane allegedly told Ignacio that he would ‘hurt him after work’ and then
pretended to punch him in the face.”).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 253.
89. Id. at 255.
90. Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. at 1445.
91. Id. at 1445 (internal quotation omitted).
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may give rise to a tort claim against the United States.”92 Thus, the Court
found “there is no basis for concluding that a law enforcement officer’s
intentional tort must occur in the course of executing a search, seizing
evidence, or making an arrest in order to subject the United States to
liability.”93
C. THE COURT’S USE OF THE INTERPRETIVE CANON IN PARI MATERIA
Along with its textual argument, amicus asserted that “[a] conduct
based reading is far more consistent with common sense . . . . A status
based reading . . . would make the United States financially responsible for
law-enforcement officers’ intentional torts having nothing to do with their
law enforcement duties . . . but not for identical torts committed by other
federal employees.”94 In responding to amicus’s argument, the Court relied
on the interpretive canon of in pari materia—statutes should be construed
together “so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking
at another statute on the same subject.”95
The Court reasoned that had Congress wanted to further narrow the
scope of the proviso it would have: “Congress adopted similar limitations in
neighboring provisions, but did not do so here.”96 As an example, the Court
referred to the law enforcement proviso’s neighbor—28 U.S.C. 2680(a)—
which reserves immunity for “[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of
an employee of the Government . . . in the execution of a statute or
regulation.”97 The Court claimed that similar to 2680(a)’s “in the execution
of a statute or regulation” language, Congress could have added “acting in a
law enforcement or investigative capacity” to the proviso, had it intended
such a limit.98
IV. IMPACT
Overturning the Third and Ninth Circuits, the Court resolved a division
among the Circuits regarding the interpretation of the FTCA’s law
92. Id. (emphasis in original). The Court’s focus on status was based on the fact that only in
the last sentence of § 2680(h), which provides a definition of “investigative or law enforcement
officer,” is there any mention of specific law enforcement activities. The operational language of
the waiver, found in the second sentence, plainly states immunity to intentional torts committed by
officers, like other torts under the FTCA, shall be waived—it makes no mention of any requisite
conduct or activity. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-31).
93. Id.
94. Brief for Amicus at 6, Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. 1441 (2013) (No. 11-10362).
95. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 386 (4th pocket ed. 2011).
96. Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. at 1446.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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enforcement proviso.99 Under the Court’s holding in Millbrook, the law
enforcement proviso’s waiver of sovereign immunity for intentional torts
committed by law enforcement officers applies “regardless of whether the
officers are engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity, or are
executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest.”100 The Court’s
ruling leaves two significant questions open to litigation: First, who
qualifies as a law enforcement officer? And second, how will the Court’s
interpretation of the law enforcement proviso be reconciled with 2680(a)’s
discretionary function exception?
A. WHO QUALIFIES AS A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER?
Had the Court followed the Pooler holding and allowed suits to be
brought against the government only for torts arising out of searches,
seizures, or arrests, this question would likely be of little significance; most
government agents who frequently engage in these types of activities are
traditionally viewed as law enforcement officers.
However, after
Millbrook, all that is required to maintain a suit is that the government agent
be empowered with those capabilities—they need not have ever employed
them.101 This clearly broadens the federal government’s waiver of
immunity; many government agents, such as, food inspectors, customs
officers, and Forest Service employees, are empowered to conduct searches,
seize evidence, and make arrests.102 Whether Congress meant to include
these types of government actors, who may not be traditionally viewed as
law enforcement officers, is a question left unanswered.
The Court, during oral arguments, was clearly concerned with the
issue; the first question posed by the Court was whether, under the morerelaxed Ignacio holding, the definition of law enforcement officer would
include a government meat inspector.103 Responding to the Court’s
question, the petitioner suggested that the proviso’s utilization of the term
officer was indicative of Congress’s intent to limit liability to acts
committed by those individuals traditionally viewed as law enforcements
officers.104 Petitioner suggested that a distinction could be made between

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-31) defines the term law
enforcement officer to mean “any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to
execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of federal law.”
102. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4, Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441 (2013)
(No. 11-10362).
103. Id. at 3.
104. Id. at 4.
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individuals acting in a law enforcement capacity—core law enforcement
officers—and those invested with the powers of search and seizure to
perform inspections—administrative employees.105
While this position seems convincing, it is tempered by the Court’s
traditional practice of reading statutory waivers of immunity strictly106 and
interpreting them using a plain text approach.107 The Court may decide that
had Congress desired to limit the government’s waiver of immunity only to
intentional torts committed by “traditional law enforcement officers” it
would have added such language to the text.108 The language of the proviso
clearly states that the term investigative or law enforcement officer “means
any officer of the United States . . . empowered by law to execute searches,
to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal Law.”109
Meat inspectors and other similar government agents are unquestionably
vested with these types of powers.110
Yet, while the Court has often resorted to plain text interpretation, it
has also “said on many occasions that a waiver of sovereign immunity must
be unequivocally expressed . . . [and] [a]ny ambiguities in the statutory
105. Id. Petitioner also argued a distinction could be made regarding the drafters’ use of the
term officer, rather than employee: “The proviso doesn’t [say] [sic] any employee of the United
States who is authorized to carry out a search, seizure, or arrest. It used the term ‘any officer of the
United States.’ And I believe the term officer carries some water here . . . . [W]e think it’s a
plausible interpretation, that by using the term ‘officer’ rather than any employee of the United
States, that there was a limiting factor imported into the statute . . . .” Id.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531 (1995) (“The question before us
is whether the waiver of sovereign immunity . . . authorizes a refund . . . . In resolving this
question, we may not enlarge the waiver beyond the purview of the statutory language. Our task
is to discern the unequivocally expressed intent of Congress, construing ambiguities in favor of
immunity.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359
(2005) (“[W]e are not free to rewrite the statute that Congress has enacted. When the statute’s
language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the
text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”) (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
107. See, e.g., Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (“A waiver of the Federal
Government’s sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text”); United
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992) (waivers of sovereign immunity must be
“unequivocally expressed” and are generally not “liberally construed”).
108. The Court used similar reasoning in Millbrook: “Had Congress intended to further
narrow the scope of the proviso, Congress could have [added the language] acting in a law
enforcement or investigative capacity.” Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. at 1446 (emphasis in original).
109. 28 U.S.C. 2680(h) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-31 approved 8-9-13) (emphasis
added).
110. See, e.g. 21 U.S.C. § 603 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-31) (“For the purpose of
preventing the use in commerce of meat and meat food products which are adulterated, the
Secretary shall cause to be made, by inspectors appointed for that purpose, an examination and
inspection of all amenable species before they shall be allowed to enter into any slaughtering,
packing, meat-canning, rendering, or similar establishment . . . and all amenable species found on
such inspection to show symptoms of disease shall be set apart and slaughtered separately from all
other [amenable species], and when so slaughtered the carcasses of said [amenable species] shall
be subject to a careful examination and inspection . . . .”).
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language are to be construed in favor of immunity.”111 To be sure, it now
appears that the Court has decided to allow determinations of whether the
proviso’s waiver of immunity will apply to a specific type of government
agent to be made on a case-by-case basis. In sum, because the Court has
resolved the question of when immunity is waived under the proviso, it is
likely there will be litigation concerning who the proviso’s waiver applies
to.
B. RECONCILING MILLBROOK WITH THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
EXCEPTION
Before Millbrook, the Circuits were already divided as to how the law
enforcement proviso’s waiver of immunity should be reconciled with
§ 2680(a)’s discretionary function exception,112 which reserves immunity
for torts committed by government agents while they are engaged in duties
of a discretionary nature.113 In cases where a law enforcement officer is
alleged to have committed a tort, some courts require the plaintiff both clear
the discretionary function exception and meet the requirements of the law
enforcement proviso’s waiver.114 Other courts allow suits meeting the
requirements of the law enforcement proviso to go forward, despite the fact
they may be discretionary and thus fall under § 2680(a).115
Part of the reason for Pooler’s narrow holding was to “eliminate the
likelihood of any overlap between” the two provisions.116 “It is hard to
imagine instances in which the activities of officers engaging in searches,

111. F.A.A. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (2012).
112. See Nguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244, 1257 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Although the Fifth
Circuit agrees with our reconciliation of § 2680(a) with (h) . . . five other circuits have taken a
different approach about how the two subsections interact.”).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-31 approved 8-9-13). “[T]he
discretionary function exception . . . generally shields the government from tort liability based on
the acts or omissions of federal agencies and employees when they are exercising or performing a
discretionary function.” Nguyen, 556 F.3d at 1250. “[C]onduct cannot be discretionary unless it
involves an element of judgment or choice.” Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536
(1988). “[It] will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a
course of action for an employee to follow.” Id. To be discretionary, acts or omissions must
involve the use of “policy judgment.” Id. at 539. “[I]f the employee’s conduct cannot
appropriately be the product of judgment or choice, then there is no discretion in the conduct for
the discretionary function exception to protect.” Id. at 536.
114. See e.g., Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (plaintiffs must “clear the
discretionary function hurdle and satisfy the investigative or law enforcement officer limitation”)
(emphasis in original).
115. See e.g., Nguyen, 556 F.3d at 1257 (“if a claim is one of those listed in the proviso to
subsection (h), there is no need to determine if the acts giving rise to it involve a discretionary
function; sovereign immunity is waived in any event.”).
116. Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1986).
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seizures or arrest would [be discretionary].”117 Now, under Millbrook’s
broader holding, there is a greater likelihood of occurrences where alleged
intentional torts will fall into both categories because the Court has
eliminated the requirement that torts occur during specific law enforcement
or investigative activities—most of which are unlikely to be
discretionary.118 Thus, whether the Court will allow suits brought under the
law enforcement proviso to go forward when they are of a discretionary
nature is unknown. However, given the holding in Millbrook, the
likelihood that this issue will arise in the future has certainly increased.
V. CONCLUSION
In Millbrook, the Court decided that Congress, via § 2680(h)’s law
enforcement proviso, intended to consent to suits alleging intentional torts
committed by federal law enforcement officers “regardless of whether the
officers are engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity.”119 While
the Court’s holding clarifies the circumstances under which the federal
government has consented to intentional tort suits, it leaves two important
questions unanswered: first, who qualifies as an “investigative or law
enforcement officer,” and second, whether intentional tort suits may be
brought against the government if the law enforcement officer was engaged
in duties of a discretionary nature when the tort occurred.
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